Bubbly Markov Equilibria (BME) are recursive equilibria on the natural state space which admit a non-trivial bubble. The present paper studies the existence and properties of BME in a general class of overlapping generations (OLG) economies with capital accumulation and stochastic production shocks. Using methods from functional analysis, we develop a general approach to construct Markov equilibria and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for these equilibria to be bubbly. Our main result shows that a BME exists whenever the bubbleless equilibrium is Pareto inefficient either due to overaccumulation of capital or inefficient risk-sharing between generations.
Introduction
A bubble is an intrinsically worthless asset which trades at a positive price such as fiat money, governmental debt, or a bond that never pays any dividends. The emergence of such a bubble has two important macroeconomic effects. First, it affects the formation of capital by providing an alternative investment opportunity to investors. Second, it creates an additional insurance possibility which affects the risk sharing arrangements among consumers.
The present paper studies the existence and properties of bubbly equilibria in a unifying framework that incorporates both of these effects as well as their mutual interactions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of this type. In order to account for the investment effect of bubbles, we place our study in the class of overlapping generations (OLG) models with production and endogenous capital accumulation. To capture the risk sharing effect, we use a stochastic setup with exogenous random production shocks. Finally, we include a dividend paying asset in our model. An asset bubble corresponds to the limiting case where dividends are zero but the price of the asset remains strictly positive.
With the previous features, our setup encompasses the case of a deterministic production economy studied in Tirole (1985) as well as stochastic models with pure exchange as in Manuelli (1990) , Aiyagari & Peled (1991) , Barbie & Kaul (2015) or Magill & Quinzii (2003) . By construction, these studies either neglect the investment or the risk sharing effect of bubbles. In this sense, our framework contains these models as special cases and we will discuss which role the previous existence results play in our extended setup.
The stochastic OLG model with production has been studied in Wang (1993 Wang ( , 1994 and, more recently, in Morand & Reffett (2007) , McGovern et al. (2013), and Hillebrand (2014) . All these studies focus on a particular class of equilibria in which the equilibrium variables are determined by time-invariant mappings on the minimal or 'natural' state space. Following Kübler & Polemarchakis (2004) , such equilibria will be called Markov Equilibria (ME). Extending this terminology, we call a ME which admits a bubble a Bubbly Markov Equilibrium (BME). Identifying conditions under which a BME exists and characterizing its properties is the general objective of this paper.
The first part of our analysis lays out a general method to construct potentially bubbly ME. This sets the stage to establish a general existence theorem for BME in the second part. A first major obstacle to construct ME in our setup is that the pointwise fixed point methods employed in Wang (1993) are no longer applicable. For this reason, our construction is based on monotone methods from functional analysis similar to Coleman (1991 Coleman ( , 2000 , or Greenwood & Huffman (1995) . This approach was successfully applied in Morand & Reffett (2007) to study bubbleless ME, and we will show how it can be extended to study BME as well. The method to be developed is also constructive and can directly be employed to compute BME numerically in applications of our results.
Production sector
The production side is represented by a single firm which operates a linear homogeneous technology to produce an all-purpose output commodity using capital and labor as inputs. In addition, production in period t is subjected to an exogenous random production shock θ t > 0. At equilibrium, labor supply will be constant and normalized to unity. Given the shock, the intensive form production function f : R + −→ R + determines production output y t in period t from the existing stock of capital k t ≥ 0 as y t = θ t f (k t ).
As in Wang (1993) , shocks are i.i.d. over time with (marginal) distribution ν supported on the compact set Θ ⊂ R ++ . Let θ min denote the minimal and θ max the maximal realization of the shock. The formal arguments in Section 3 assume that Θ is a finite set. The process {θ t } t≥0 induces a probability space (Ω, F, P) on which all random variables are defined and a filtration {F t } t≥0 such that θ t is F t -measurable. Throughout, the notion of an adapted stochastic process {ξ t } t≥0 refers to this filtration and implies that each ξ t can depend only on random variables θ n , n ≤ t. Moreover, E t [·] := E[·|F t ] is the conditional expectations operator.
The following restrictions on f are standard and will be imposed throughout the paper.
Assumption 1
The map f : R + −→ R + is C 2 with derivatives f < 0 < f and lim k→0 f (k) = ∞. Moreover, there exists an upper boundk > 0 such that θ max f (k) < k whenever k >k.
Market clearing and profit maximizing behavior imply that the equilibrium wage w t and capital return r t are determined by the capital stock k t > 0 and the shock as θ t ∈ Θ as
r t = R(k t , θ t ) := θ t f (k t ).
Denote by E φ (z) := | zφ (z) φ(z)
|, z ∈ R the (absolute) elasticity of a differentiable function φ = 0. Below we will occasionally impose the following additional restrictions on f :
(T 1) E f ≤ 1 (T 2) 2E f ≥ 1.
As (T1) is equivalent to k → kR(k, θ) being weakly increasing, this restriction is known as 'capital income monotonicity' and often imposed in the literature, cf. Wang (1993) , Hauenschild (2002) , and others. It holds in the Cobb-Douglas case f (k) = k α for 0 < α < 1 and also for CES technologies f (k) = [1 − a + ak ] 1 where 0 < a < 1 and 0 < < 1. The second restriction (T2) imposes a uniform lower bound on the elasticity of f . In the Cobb-Douglas case, this restricts α to the empirically relevant case α ≤
Consumption sector
The consumption sector consists of overlapping generations of consumers who live for two periods. For simplicity, there is no population growth and the size of each generation is normalized to unity. Young consumers earn income from supplying one unit of labor inelastically to the labor market while old consumers earn the proceeds on their investments made during the previous period.
To transfer income to the second period of life, there are two investment possibilities available to a young consumer in period t. First, she can invest in capital to earn the uncertain capital return r t+1 in the next period per unit invested at time t. Second, she can invest in assets given by retradeable shares of a fruit tree (Lucas tree) which pay a constant non-random dividend d ≥ 0 in each period. Let p t ≥ 0 denote the asset price per share in period t ≥ 0. The total supply of shares is normalized to unity.
A young consumer in period t observes her labor income w t > 0 and the buying price of shares p t ≥ 0 while taking the selling price p t+1 ≥ 0 and the capital return r t+1 > 0 as given random variables in her decision. The consumer chooses the desired investments in capital s and in shares z to maximize expected lifetime utility. Assuming an additive von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function U (c y , c o ) = u(c y ) + v(c o ) over lifetime consumption, the decision problem reads:
Throughout, we impose the following standard restrictions on the utility functions.
Assumption 2
Both g ∈ {u, v} are C 2 with derivatives satisfying g < 0 < g and lim c→0 g (c) = ∞.
The capital investment s t in period t determines the capital stock k t+1 of the following period. Combining this with the first-order conditions of the decision problem (2), one obtains the following Euler equations which must hold in each period t at equilibrium:
The following additional restrictions on v will occasionally be used in the sequel:
Condition (U1) is again a standard restriction also imposed in Morand & Reffett (2007) or McGovern et al. (2013) . Under (U2) second-period utility v displays constant relative risk aversion, an assumption that is more restrictive but also widely used in applied macroeconomic models.
Markov Equilibria (ME)
The dividend payment d ≥ 0 will be a key parameter in our analysis. For a given value d ≥ 0, the economy is summarized by the list E d = u, v, f, ν, d plus initial conditions for capital k 0 > 0 and the shock θ 0 ∈ Θ. Specifically, we refer to the economy E := E 0 in which dividend payments are zero as as the benchmark economy in our framework.
Note that E corresponds to the economy studied in Wang (1993) .
The following definition is standard and provides the most general notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1
Given initial values k 0 > 0 and θ 0 ∈ Θ, a sequential equilibrium (SE) of E d is an adapted stochastic process w t , r t , p t , k t+1 t≥0 which satisfies (1a,b) and (3a,b) for all t ≥ 0.
The induced equilibrium consumption processes can be recovered as c
In this paper, we focus on a particular class of equilibria where all equilibrium variables are determined by time-invariant functions of some state variable x t which takes values in the state space X. In the literature, such equilibria are called Recursive Equilibria (RE). We confine ourselves to a particular class of recursive equilibria where the state variable is x t = (k t , θ t ). The underlying state space X is called the natural state space. Note that the factor price mappings W and R from (1a,b) already satisfy this property. Following the terminology of Kübler & Polemarchakis (2004) , RE on the natural state space are called Markov Equilibria (ME). In the following definition, X ⊂ R ++ × Θ is assumed to be a non-empty Borel set which will be constructed explicitly in the next section.
ensures that W := [w min , w max ] is a compact self-supporting set for the dynamics (7). While this would also permit to choose the state space X compact along the bubbleless ME, these choices neither extend to the bubbly case nor to a ME of
Constructing Markov Equilibria
The pointwise construction of ME employed in Wang (1993) and the previous section is available only in the bubbleless case. For this reason, the following sections develop a more general approach which is based on methods from functional analysis similar to Morand & Reffett (2007) . It is shown in Hillebrand (2014) that this approach is equivalent to the pointwise construction in Wang (1993) in the bubbleless case. Our method permits to construct ME of the general class of economies E d , d ≥ 0 introduced in the previous section. Identifying conditions under which the solution obtained for d = 0 defines a bubbly ME of the benchmark economy E then becomes a separate issue to be explored in Section 3.
The following sections throughout impose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Using the results from Section 1.4, define w max as in (8) and the reduced state space
, and the natural state space X = K × Θ.
Defining an operator T d
Given d ≥ 0, the following analysis aims to construct ME of E d as fixed points of an operator T d defined on some suitably chosen function space G . To restrict the class of candidate equilibrium functions G , a first and crucial observation is that the current state x t = (k t , θ t ) enters the Euler equations (3a,b) only through the wage w t = W (x t ). Therefore, we conjecture that, similar to the bubbleless equilibrium, the mappings from Definition 2 can be written as K
Under this hypothesis, the problem of determining a ME is equivalent to determining the two functions (K d , P d ) consistent with the Euler equations (3a,b). Moreover, we will show below that any solution P d uniquely determines the associated capital function K d . Thus, we are essentially left to determine the function P d . We restrict our search for this solution to the function space
The space G is endowed with the usual pointwise ordering, i.e., P 1 ≥ P 2 (P 1 > P 2 ) iff
The previous insights greatly simplify the construction of ME because they permit to reduce the problem of determining two functions (P
) both defined on X to finding a single function P d defined on the one-dimensional space W. In the sequel we will construct P d as a fixed point of some operator T d defined on G . The additional monotonicity restrictions in (10) will be necessary for this operator to be well-defined.
Let d ≥ 0 be arbitrary but fixed. The key ingredient to construct the operator T d are the Euler equations (3a,b). The idea is as follows: At some fixed point in time, suppose next period's asset price is determined by some function P ∈ G of next period's wage. Then, for any current state w ∈ W, the current price p and capital investment k must solve the Euler equations (3a,b). Given P ∈ G and some fixed w ∈ W, let
which are defined for all 0 < k < k max and p ≥ 0 such that k + p < w. Then, for any fixedw ∈ W, the problem is to determinek ∈ K, andp ≥ 0 such thatk +p <w and
First, consider the problem (12) for d = 0. For this case, we have the following result.
Lemma 2.1 In addition to Assumptions 1-3, let (T1) and (U1) be satisfied and suppose d = 0. Then, for any P ∈ G andw ∈ W, there is a unique solutionp ≥ 0 andk ∈ K to (12).
the results to carry over to more general classes of economies including correlated production shocks. Clearly, in this case the function space G consists of mappings defined on X rather than W.
Lemma 2.1 permits to define functions T P : W −→ R + and K P : W −→ R ++ which determine the unique solution to (12) if d = 0, i.e., T P (w) :=p and K P (w) :=k for each w ∈ W. This induces an operator T on G which associates with any function P ∈ G the new function T (P ) := T P . We also denote by K • the operator on G which assigns to P ∈ G the function K P .
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The following result shows that T maps G into itself and establishes several additional properties. Here, the additional restrictions (T2) and (U2) are needed to ensure that T maps monotonic functions to monotonic functions.
Lemma 2.2
In addition to Assumptions 1-3, let (T1), (U1), and either (T2) or (U2) hold. Then T : G −→ G . Further, for each P ∈ G the following holds:
(ii) K P is continuous and increasing,
In a second step, consider now the problem (12) for d > 0. Observe that this problem is identical to the case where d = 0 if P is replaced by the functionP = P + d, i.e., P (w) := P (w) + d for all w ∈ W. Clearly,
Then, by Lemmata 2.1 and 2.2, for each P ∈ G ,w ∈ W and fixed d ≥ 0, the unique solution to (12) is given byp = T d P (w) andk = K P +d (w). In particular, T 0 = T . The relation (13) shows that T d inherits all properties derived above for T . In particular, T d maps G into itself and
Montonicity properties of T d
We conjecture -and prove in the next subsection -that a fixed point of
In this regard, the last result from Lemma 2.2 implies K * d ≤ K 0 with the latter defined by (5). This property permits to employ W =]0, w max ] as the reduced state space and X = K × Θ as the natural state space along any ME.
Our ultimate goal in this paper is to prove the existence of a BME which corresponds to a non-trivial fixed point P * 0 > 0 of T . Unfortunately, however, Lemma 2.2 already showed that the trivial solution P = 0 is always a fixed point of T , so a mere existence result will not help. Instead, we will explicitly construct fixed points as pointwise limits of function sequences. The method is similar to the one developed in Greenwood & Huffman (1995) , see also Morand & Reffett (2003 .
A key property for this construction to be successful is that T d be monotonic which, by (13) is equivalent to monotonicity of T which we will consider first. A major obstacle to establish this property globally on G is that the methods from differential calculus including the implicit function theorem are not available for all functions in G . To remedy this problem, we will temporarily restrict ourselves (respectively T ) to the smaller set
of continuously differentiable functions in G . Observe that G still contains the trivial solution P ≡ 0. The next result shows that T maps G into itself.
Lemma 2.3
Under the hypotheses of Lemma 2.2, P ∈ G implies T P ∈ G .
The following result now establishes the monotonicity of T on G which will turn out to be sufficient to apply the construction principle below. In addition, we show that K • is strictly decreasing on G which resembles the usual crowding-out effect of assets.
Lemma 2.4
In addition to Assumptions 1-3, let (T1) and (U1) hold. Then, T is monotonically increasing on G , i.e., for any P 0 , P 1 ∈ G , P 1 ≥ P 0 implies T (P 1 ) ≥ T (P 0 ) and
It follows directly from (13) that the operator T d inherits all previous properties from T . In particular, T d is monotonic on G and maps this subclass into itself. In addition,
For later reference, we state these properties formally in the next result.
Corollary 2.1 Under the hypotheses of Lemma 2.4, T d satisfies the following monotonicity properties:
(ii) For all P ∈ G and
2.3 Constructing ME as fixed points of T d
Let d ≥ 0 be arbitrary but fixed. We are now in a position to construct ME of E d as fixed points of 
is strictly decreasing. Thus, the pointwise limit
is well-defined for all w ∈ W as (P m d (w)) m≥0 is a strictly decreasing sequence bounded by zero. We show that the limiting function satisfies P *
being true for all m ≥ 1 also hold in the limit and imply that P * d inherits the previous monotonicity properties. Using an argument developed and proved in Morand & Reffett (2003 , p.1369 , these properties already imply continuity of P *
The previous findings lead to the following main result.
Theorem 1
In addition to Assumptions 1-3, let (T1), (U1), and either (T2) or (U2) hold. Then, for each d ≥ 0 the functions P * d defined in (15) and K * d := K P * d +d satisfy the following:
(ii) Both mappings P * d and K * d are continuous and increasing.
For d = 0, the previous construction delivers a unique ME (K * 0 , P * 0 ) of E . Clearly, P * 0 = 0 implies K * 0 = K 0 defined by (5) which yields precisely the bubbleless equilibrium studied in Section 1.4. The main question of this paper, however, is when does P * 0 > 0 hold? Before exploring this question in the next section, we present an alternative way to construct the ME from Theorem 1 for the benchmark economy E . The proof of our main existence result will be based on this construction. The idea is to obtain the ME of E as the limit of ME of dividend economies E d as d goes to zero. Formally, let (d n ) n≥1 be a decreasing sequence of dividends such that d n ≥ 0 for all n and lim n→∞ d n = 0. By Theorem 1, for each n ≥ 1 the functions P * dn defined by (15) and K * dn = K P * dn +dn define a ME of E dn . The following result shows that the sequence of ME constructed in this fashion indeed converges (pointwise) to the ME of E defined by Theorem 1.
Lemma 2.5
For any positive dividend sequence (d n ) n≥1 converging monotonically to zero, the induced sequence of ME (K * dn , P * dn ) n≥1 from Theorem 1 converges pointwise to (K * 0 , P * 0 ).
Existence of Bubbly Markov Equilibria
In this section we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ME (K * 0 , P * 0 ) constructed in Theorem 1 is bubbly, i.e., P * 0 > 0. Our main result stated as Theorem 2 below shows that this is the case whenever the bubbleless equilibrium derived in Section 1.4 is Pareto inefficient. As the proof requires that the (reduced) state space can be chosen compact along this equilibrium, the following sections replace our previous Assumption 3 by the stronger Assumption 4. In addition, the formal arguments in the proofs of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 2 below assume that the shock space Θ is finite without explicit notice. These restrictions allow us to easily use the characterization of Pareto-inefficiency along with Proposition 4 from Barbie, Hagedorn & Kaul (2007) . An extension to the case where Θ is an interval seems straightforward (but tedious) along the lines of Proposition 1 in Barbie & Kaul (2015) . All other arguments and proofs in this section are formulated and hold for the general case where Θ is an interval.
In the following analysis, define w max by (8) and w min by (9). As a notational convention, a superscript * identifies functions associated with the ME constructed in Theorem 1.
Pareto optimality
Our concept of Pareto optimality corresponds to Interim Pareto Optimality (IPO) as defined and studied, e.g., in Demange & Laroque (2000) or Conditional Pareto Optimality (CPO) as in Chattopadhyay & Gottardi (1999) . The following definition formalizes this concept for the class of economies E d defined above for a fixed value d ≥ 0. 
for all t ≥ 0 and for some t ≥ 0 there exists a non-empty set A ∈ F t such that u t (ω) >ũ t (ω) for all ω ∈ A.
(iii) Allocation a ∈ A d (x 0 ) is called Pareto optimal or efficient if it is not dominated by any other allocation in A d (x 0 ). Otherwise, it is called inefficient.
Our main result in Theorem 2 below establishes that the benchmark economy E = E 0 has a BME whenever the bubbleless equilibrium allocation is Pareto inefficient. To state this result formally, we introduce the concept of a Markovian equilibrium allocation.
Markovian equilibrum allocations (MEA)
For fixed d ≥ 0, identify a ME of E d with the mappings (K, P ) on W =]0, w max ] constructed as in the previous sections (here and in the sequel we drop the subscript d when convenient). We seek to derive the induced mappings which determine the consumption process along a ME. It will be convenient to define these mappings on the reduced state space W rather than X and to identify the state at time t by w t . For this reason, we fix the realization of the initial shock θ 0 ∈ Θ 5 and define the consumption mappings associated with a ME (K, P ) as
We call the triple A = (K, C y , C o ) a Markovian Equilibrium Allocation (MEA). The pricing kernel associated with A is defined as the map m A :
For each w 0 ∈ W, a MEA determines a unique feasible allocation a
, 1) for t ≥ 0 while old-age consumption c o 0 in t = 0 follows from the aggregate resource constraint. Consequently, we adopt the following notions of efficiency/inefficiency for MEA.
Definition 5
(iii) efficient/inefficient if it is efficient/inefficient at each w 0 ∈ W.
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The previous formulation permits consumption and capital along the ME to be expressed as functions of the (reduced) state process {w t } t≥0 . Given w 0 ∈ W, the statistical evolution of this process is determined by a time-invariant transition probability Q (see Appendix B for details). Therefore, the lifetime utility u t of generation t from Definition 4 (ii) also depends exclusively on the state w t . Combining results from Barbie, Hagedorn & Kaul (2007) and Barbie & Kaul (2015) , these properties will allow us to characterize 5 This restriction is necessary because initial old-age consumption c o 0 can, in general, not be written as a function of w 0 but requires knowledge of the full initial state x 0 . If θ 0 is fixed, there is a one-to one correspondence between w 0 and the initial state x 0 and the process {x t } t≥0 can fully be recovered from {w t } t≥0 as k t = K(w t−1 ) and θ t = w t /W (k t , 1) for t ≥ 1.
6 Under the additional restrictions from Lemma 3.1 (ii) below, the efficiency properties of A become to some extent independent of the initial state w 0 .
the (in-)efficiency of MEA in terms of mappings defined on a one-dimensional state space which greatly simplifies this characterization. To obtain these results, the following additional restrictions on MEA will be employed.
Definition 6
Let A = (K, C y , C 0 ) be a MEA defined as above.
(i) We call A continuous if the mappings K, C y , and C o are all continuous.
(ii) We call a subset of the form W = [w, w max ] ⊂ W a stable set and w > 0 a lower
(iii) We call A bounded, if for each w 0 ∈ W there is some stable set W containing w 0 . 
A general existence theorem
We are now in a position to state our main existence result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2
In addition to Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, let (U1), (T1), and either (U2) or (T2) hold. If A 0 is inefficient, then (K * 0 , P * 0 ) defines a BME of E , i.e., P * 0 > 0.
The intuition behind the proof of Theorem 2 is straightforward. Consider a monotonic sequence of strictly positive dividend payments (d n ) n≥1 which converges to zero. For each n ≥ 1, construct the ME (K * dn , P * dn ) of E dn as in Theorem 1 and denote by A * dn the induced MEA defined as above. It is well-known that each A * dn , being an equilibrium allocation of an economy with a dividend-paying asset, is efficient. Intuitively, one would expect that this efficiency also holds in the limit such that the sequence (A * dn ) n≥1 can not converge to A 0 if A 0 is inefficient. Thus, A 0 = A * 0 which is only possible if P * 0 > 0, i.e., (K * 0 , P * 0 ) is bubbly.
The same argument is used in Barbie & Kaul (2015) , going back to the basic idea in Aiyagari & Peled (1991) , for the case of an exchange economy, where instead of the monotonicity methods applied here Schauder's fixed point theorem is used. Since in our framework in addition the capital stock adjusts as an endogenous variable, the analysis becomes more complicated than under pure exchange.
We preface the proof of Theorem 2 by the following three lemmata. The first result is a sort of unit root condition, which is used in OLG models with finitely many states to characterize the Pareto optimality of stationary competitive equilibria. The proof is an adaption of the results from Barbie, Hagedorn & Kaul (2007) and Barbie & Kaul (2015) and is relegated to Appendix B. Note the similarity of (18) to the conditions for inefficiency in Demange & Laroque (2000) or Magill & Quinzii (2003) .
be a MEA which is continuous and bounded.
(ii) If m A in (17) is increasing, then η in (i) can be chosen continuous. Moreover, if A is inefficient at some w 0 ∈ W, it is also inefficient for all w 0 ≥ w 0 .
Let m 0 := m A 0 be the pricing kernel associated with the bubbleless allocation A 0 . Our next result ensures that η in (18) can be chosen continuous whenever A 0 is inefficient.
Lemma 3.2
If Assumptions 1-3, (T1), (U1), and either (T2) or (U2) hold, then m 0 is increasing.
Finally, we have the following sufficient condition for inefficiency. This condition also appears as part of Theorem 1 of Barbie & Kaul (2015) and as Theorem 1 in Demange & Laroque (2000) . The proof we give here is similar to the ones given in these papers. We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2 in five steps.
Step 1: Let w 0 ∈ W be arbitrary and W = W A 0 = [w, w max ] be a stable set of A 0 containing w 0 such that W (K 0 (w), θ min )/w > 1. Assumption 4 ensures that such a set exists. By hypothesis, A 0 is inefficient at w 0 . Thus, invoking Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2, there exists a continuous function η : W →]0, 1] such that for all w ∈ W:
Step 2: Define the sequence (d n ) n≥1 as d n :=d/n for n ≥ 1 withd > 0 specified below. For each n ≥ 1, let (K * dn , P * dn ) be the ME of E dn from Theorem 1 and define the induced MEA A * dn = (K * dn , C y * dn , C o * dn ) as in Section 3.2. By Lemma 2.5, the sequence (K * dn , P * dn ) n≥1 converges pointwise to the ME (K * 0 , P * 0 ) of E which satisfies either P * 0 = 0 or P * 0 > 0. We will show that the first case is impossible under the hypotheses of Step 3: We choosed > 0 such that W = [w, w max ] is stable for each A * dn . Since (K * dn ) n≥1 is increasing by Theorem 1 (i), it suffices to specifyd such that W is stable for A * d 1
. As
Step 4: Standard arguments imply that each A * dn is efficient on W. To see this, define for n ≥ 1 the continuous function R *
n is a return in the sense of Barbie, Hagedorn & Kaul (2007) , cf. their equation (5). For all T > 0 and w 0 ∈ W, monotonicity of P *
M for any realization of shocks θ 1 , . . . , θ T where w t = W (K * dn (w t−1 ), θ t ). Note that M is independent of T and the shocks. Using Proposition 4(a) in Barbie, Hagedorn & Kaul (2007) , this implies that A * dn is interim Pareto efficient on W.
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Step 5: Combining the previous result with Lemma 3.3 shows that for each n ≥ 1 there exists some w n ∈ W such that
Since W is compact, the sequence (w n ) n≥1 contains a subsequence converging to some w * ∈ W. Denote this sequence again by (w n ) n≥1 . Clearly, lim n→∞ η(w n ) = η(w * ) by continuity of η. We would like to show that for all
Since all functions in (21) are continuous, it suffices to show that lim n→∞ P * dn (w n ) = 0 and lim n→∞ K * dn (w n ) = K 0 (w * ). We have that lim n→∞ sup{P * dn (w) | w ∈ W} = 0 by Theorem A in Buchanan & Hildebrandt (1908) 9 , which immediately gives the result for P * dn . Also by Theorem A in Buchanan & Hildebrandt (1908) , (K * dn ) n≥1 being a sequence of strictly monotonic functions converges uniformly to K 0 on the compact interval W. Combined with continuity of K 0 , for any δ > 0 there exists n 0 such that n > n 0 implies This proves (21). Further, η is bounded as a continuous function on the compact set W while 0 < m n (w n , θ) < v (Kd(w)R(Kd(w), θ min ))/u (w max ) for each θ ∈ Θ. Thus, by the Lebesgue-dominated convergence theorem, (20) and (21) imply
But this contradicts (19) and proves the claim that P * 0 > 0. The previous construction also suggests that the limiting MEA A * 0 associated with the BME (K * 0 , P * 0 ) is efficient. Clearly, if A * 0 is bounded, this follows immediately from the same arguments used in Step 4. Unfortunately, however, boundedness of A * 0 is not guaranteed even if the bubbleless equilibrium satisfies Assumption 4.
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 2, suppose the shock process is non-degenerate, i.e., θ min < θ max or, equivalently, w min < w max defined by (8) and (9). Then, for any initial value w 0 ∈ W, the dynamics (7) takes values in the ergodic set [w min , w max ] after finitely many periods with positive probability. In this case, global inefficiency of A 0 is equivalent to inefficiency on the ergodic set which, by Lemma 3.1 (ii) and 3.2 is equivalent to A 0 being inefficient at w min . Thus, we obtain the following existence result as a corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 3.1 In addition to Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, let (U1), (T1), and either (U2) or (T2) hold. If w min < w max and A 0 is inefficient at w min , then (K * 0 , P * 0 ) is a BME of E , i.e., P * 0 > 0.
Conditions for inefficiency of A 0
In this section we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for A 0 to be inefficient as required in Theorem 1 which are simple and easy to verify. As in the previous section, we impose the stronger Assumption 4 and define w max by (8) and w min by (9).
Define the bubbleless MEA
Economically, the value 1/M (w) can be interpreted as the riskless return in state w ∈ W. Using (5) and the definition (17) of m 0 , M can equivalently be written as
The representation in (24) reveals directly that M is continuously differentiable and satisfies 0 ≤ M (w) ≤ 1/R(K 0 (w); θ min ) for all w. The latter implies lim w 0 M (w) = 0.
Our first result states a simple sufficient condition under which A 0 is inefficient. Note that the additional restrictions (T2) or (U2) are not required here. Proof: We construct a continuous function η :]0, w max ] −→ R ++ which satisfies (19) for all w ∈ W. By Lemma 3.3, this implies inefficiency of A 0 on any stable set [w, w max ] which implies inefficiency on W.
Defining W E 0 as in (7), note that W E 0 (·; θ min ) is strictly increasing and, therefore, invertible on its range. Denote the inverse by Λ. By continuity of M , there exists δ > 0 such that M (w) > 1 for all w ∈ [w min − δ, w max ]. Construct a sequence (w n ) n≥0 by setting w 0 := w min − δ and w n := Λ(w n−1 ) = Λ n (w 0 ) for n ≥ 1. Note that (w n ) n≥0 is strictly decreasing and, due to Assumption 4, converges to zero. Now construct η as follows. For w ∈ [w 0 , w max ], let η(w) ≡ 1. Then, A partial converse to Lemma 3.4 is the following result.
Lemma 3.5 Let Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and (T1) and (U1) hold. If A 0 is inefficient, then M (w) > 1 for at least one w ∈ [w min , w max ].
Proof: By contradiction, suppose A 0 is inefficient but M (w) ≤ 1 for all w ∈ [w min , w max ]. By Lemma 3.1, there is an upper-semi-continuous function η : W −→ R ++ such that
for all w ∈ [w min , w max ]. By Theorem 2.43 in Aliprantis & Border (2007, p.44) , η attains a maximum on any compact set and the set of maximizers is compact. Letting w * ∈ [w min , w max ] be a value for which η(w * ) = η max := max{η(w) | w ∈ [w min , w max ]},
which is a contradiction.
The previous conditions take an even simpler form under the additional restrictions (T2) or (U2). In this case, monotonicity of m 0 due to Lemma 3.2 implies that M is strictly increasing. Combining Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5 then leads to the following main result.
Theorem 3
In addition to Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, let (T1), (U1), and either (T2) or (U2) hold.
In the deterministic case where w min = w max , the two conditions from Theorem 3 reduce to M (w min ) > 1 which is equivalent to a capital return R < 1 at the bubbleless steady state. This is precisely the condition in Tirole (1985) which is sufficient and necessary in the deterministic case. In the present stochastic case, the condition M > 1 requires an 'average' capital return less than unity on the ergodic set [w min , w max ].
An example economy
The following example illustrates the construction of ME of E developed in Section 2 and the previous conditions under which the ME is bubbly. We also demonstrate that the condition M (w min ) > 1 from Theorem 3 is not necessary for a BME to exist.
Suppose f (k) = k α , 0 < α < 1, u(c) = log(c), and v(c) = βu(c), β > 0. This parametrization is widely studied in the literature, cf. Michel & Wigniolle (2003) or Demange & Laroque (2000) . Rangazas & Russell (2005) provide a detailed discussion of the (dynamic) efficiency properties of the bubbleless equilibrium allocation.
One verifies directly that Assumptions 1 and 2 and the additional restrictions (T1), (U1), and (U2) hold. Moreover, the mapping K 0 associated with the bubbleless ME of E defined by (5) computes K 0 (w) = β 1+β w such that W E 0 defined in (7) takes the form
Direct computations reveal that W E 0 (·, θ max ) has a unique non-trivial fixed point given by
1−α and Assumption 4 is satisfied. For later reference, let k max := K 0 (w max ) denote the maximum capital stock and R max := R(k max , θ max ) the associated maximum capital return. These values compute explicitly as k max = [ β 1+β
(1 − α)θ max ] Applying the construction principle from Section 2.3, let P 0 = id W and consider the sequence (P n ) n≥0 defined as P n = T (P n−1 ), n ≥ 1. As P (w) = δw implies T P (w) = [R max + δ 1+β β ] −1 P (w) for w ∈ W, the operator T maps linear functions onto linear functions. Thus, each P n is linear and can be computed explicitly as
For each w ∈ W, the limit P * 0 defined in (15) is given by
Thus, in this example, the ME constructed is bubbly, if and only if R max < 1 which is equivalent to A 0 being Pareto inefficient. To relate this result to the condition in Theorem 3 (ii), consider the function M defined in (24) which can be computed as
One verifies by direct computations that in this case, M (w max ) =
1 Rmax
On the other hand, one can easily choose a distribution ν such that E ν [θ min /(·)] < R max < 1. In this case, the fixed point in (26) satisfies P * 0 > 0 and E has a BME even though M (w min ) < 1.
In the previous example, the ME defined by (15) is bubbly, if and only if R max < 1. We remark that the same condition can be used to ensure existence of a BME in the more general case where (U1) holds and both u and v display constant relative risk aversion (of the same degree) while f satisfies the restriction (T1') E f + E f ≤ 1 which is slightly stronger than (T1) but also holds in the Cobb-Douglas case. Again, Assumptions 1-4 are all satisfied for this example. The condition R(k max ; θ max ) < 1 now ensures existence of a linear function P (w) = δw, w ∈ W, 0 < δ < 1 which is a lower bound for T in the sense that T P > P .
10 By the monotonicity properties of T , the fixed point in (15) satisfies P * 0 > P > 0 and, therefore, defines a BME. While sufficient, it is not clear whether R max < 1 is also necessary for a BME to exist in this more general case and whether R max < 1 is sufficient in more general cases. We suspect that, in general, a characterization of inefficiency simpler than the one in Lemma 3.1 is not available.
Dynamics along a BME
Suppose the ME (K * 0 , P * 0 ) of E constructed in Theorem 1 is bubbly, i.e., P * 0 > 0. We seek to deduce several qualitative properties of the equilibrium dynamics along a BME.
Given the initial state x 0 = (k 0 , θ 0 ) ∈ X, all equilibrium variables can be expressed as continuous functions of the equilibrium wage process {w t } t≥0 which evolves as
It will again be convenient to study (28) rather than the mathematically equivalent capital dynamics generated by
where the latter is defined in (7). Thus, the sequence generated by (28) is bounded by the wage process (7) along the bubbleless equilibrium under any path of the shock process {θ t } t≥0 .
A second observation that follows from the Euler equations (3a,b) is that in each period the return on the bubbly asset must (weakly) exceed the capital return (1b) in at least one future state. Thus, for each w ∈ W there exists some θ ∈ Θ such that
As lim w→0 R(K * 0 (w), θ ) = ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ and the left side in (29) is increasing in the shock, there exists a lower bound w > 0 such that R(K * 0 (w), θ min ) > 1 and P * 0 (W E (w, θ max )) > P * 0 (w) for all w ≤ w . Thus, by monotonicity of P * 0
for all w ≤ w . As W E (w max , θ max ) < W E 0 (w max , θ max ) = w max , (30) also shows that W E (·, θ max ) has at least one stable fixed point which lies in the interval ]w , w max [. In fact, since θ max belongs to the support of ν, (30) and continuity of W E imply that for each w ≤ w there exists a measurable set Θ w ⊂ Θ of positive measure ν(Θ w ) > 0 such that W E (w, θ) > w holds for all θ ∈ Θ w . Thus, defining p * := P * 0 (w ), one observes that the bubbly asset price process {p t } t≥0 along the BME is persistent in the sense that whenever p t < p * there is a positive probability that p t+n > p * for some finite n ≥ 1.
An open question is whether this last result can be strengthened in the sense that p t < p * implies p t+n > p * for some finite n ≥ 1 with probability one. Essentially, this holds when the wage dynamics (28) admits a uniform lower bound w > 0 such that W E (w, θ) > w for all θ ∈ Θ whenever w ≤ w . The example from Section 3.5 satisfies this condition. If such a lower bound exists, the bubble price processes and in fact all equilibrium variables remain bounded away from zero with probability one. Clearly, Assumption 4 is a necessary precondition for this to hold, but is it sufficient? This question becomes particularly relevant for studying the existence of stationary distributions associated with the state process defined by (28) which we leave for future research.
Conclusions
This paper developed a general approach to construct potentially bubbly Markov equilibria for a general class of frictionless OLG economies with stochastic production. Our main result shows that a BME exists whenever the bubbleless equilibrium is inefficient. This type of inefficiency can be the result of an overaccumulation of capital but also due to inefficient risk sharing between consumers. The deterministic result of Tirole (1985) therefore constitutes a special case of our existence theorem.
To focus on this existence result and keep the technical part bearable, we deliberately limited the underlying class of economies to a setup with i.i.d. TFP shocks and additive consumer utility. We believe that these restrictions are inessential and easy to dispense with at a cost of a more complex structure and notation. Potential extensions of the previous framework include non-additive consumer utility, non-multiplicative and correlated production shocks, and non-classical production technologies. These extensions were employed, e.g., in Wang (1994) , Morand & Reffett (2007) , McGovern, Morand & Reffett (2013 ), or Hillebrand (2014 to study the existence and properties of bubbleless ME. Since all these papers rely on methods similar to those employed in this paper, we believe that the previous construction of a BME should be amendable to these extensions. This constitutes a first major objective of future research.
In addition, several issues remain to be studied even within the framework of this paper. For instance, an open question is if the bubbly equilibrium is always efficient and, related to that, whether it constitutes a Pareto improvement relative to the bubbleless equilibrium. The characterization of Pareto optimality developed in Section 3 should be key to answer these questions. Another avenue of future research is whether the state dynamics along the BME converge to a stationary distribution on the endogenous state space. Since our equilibrium mappings are all monotonic, we view the recent results of Kamihigashi & Stachurski (2014) as tailor-made for studying the existence, uniqueness, and stability of stationary distributions along a BME.
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1 (i) Let P ∈ G be given and w ∈ W be arbitrary but fixed. For each k ∈ K =]0, k max ] and θ ∈ Θ, set c(k, θ) := P (W (k, θ)) + kR(k, θ) which is a strictly increasing function due to monotonicity of P and (T1). For k ∈ K, define the functions
Since P is continuous, so are the mappingsP ,Ñ , D, and S. Observe thatÑ in (A.2) is weakly increasing due to (U1) and monotonicity of c(·, θ) while D is strictly decreasing which implies that S is strictly increasing. Furthermore, by the boundary conditions imposed in Assumptions 1 and 2
which, together with the monotonicity ofÑ implies
Then, the desired solutionk solves G(k; w) = 0. Observe that G(·; w) is a strictly increasing function which follows from the monotonicity of S and D and u . Thus, any zero is necessarily unique. Also observe the boundary behavior lim k→0 G(k; w) = −∞ due to (A.3). By continuity, it suffices to find a k < w such that G(k; w) ≥ 0. Suppose P ≡ 0. Then the solution isk = k 0 := K 0 (w) defined by (5) andp = 0. If P = 0, consider the following two cases. First, S(k 0 ) ≥ w. Then, by (A.4) and monotonicity and continuity of S, there exists a unique value 0 <k ≤ k 0 such that
Thus, in either case, there exists a solution 0 <k ≤ k 0 < w. Settingp =P (k) completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Let P ∈ G be arbitrary. As shown in the previous proof, T P =P • K P whereP is defined in (A.1) and, for w ∈ W, k = K P (w) is the unique solution to G(k; w) = 0 defined in (A.5). Clearly, K P is continuous. Note from (A.1) that T P ≥ 0, P > 0 implies T P > 0 and P = 0 implies T P = 0. As G in (A.5) is increasing in P and P , K P ≤ K 0 for all P with strict inequality if P > 0. By definition of K P and (A.5), w > S(K P (w)) >P (K P (w)) = T P (w) for w ∈ W which proves T P < id W .
To show that w → w − T P (w) is (even strictly) increasing, let w ∈ W be arbitrary and choose ∆ > 0 such that w + ∆ ∈ W. We show that T P (w + ∆) < T P (w) + ∆. By contradiction, suppose T P (w + ∆) ≥ T P (w) + ∆. Note that G defined in (A.5) is strictly decreasing in w and strictly increasing in k by strict monotonicity of D and S. These properties imply that K P is strictly increasing which gives K P (w + ∆) > K P (w). Further, as shown in the previous proof, the function D defined in (A.2) is strictly decreasing which gives D(K P (w + ∆)) < D(K P (w)). But by (A.5) and our hypothesis
which is a contradiction and proves that w → w − T P (w) is increasing. Next, we show that T P is increasing. As T P =P • K P and we have already shown that K P is strictly increasing, it remains to show thatP defined in (A.1) is increasing as well.
To avoid trivialities, assume in the remainder that P > 0. Adjusting the arguments to the case where P ≥ 0 is straightforward. Let k ∈ K and ∆ > 0 be arbitrary such that k + ∆ ∈ K. We show thatP (k + ∆) ≥P (k). By (U1), the map a → av (a + b), a > 0 is increasing for any b ≥ 0. Using this and monotonicity of P • W and v in (A.1) gives
where we abuse our notation by writing just P (k, θ) rather than P (W (k, θ)). As V (0) = P (k), it suffices to show that V is increasing if either (T2) or (U2) holds. Observe that V is C 1 and the derivative satisfies V (∆) ≥ 0, if and only if
The derivatives in (A.6) compute as
Using both inequalities together with (T2) shows that (A.6) holds. Second, suppose (U2) holds and let ∆ ≥ 0 be fixed. Consider the non-negative random
2 both defined on the probability space (Θ, B(Θ), ν).
]. Combining these inequalities shows that (A.6) is satisfied provided that
But (A.9) follows from Hölder's inequality (see Aliprantis & Border (2007, p.463 setting p = q = 2 which implies 1 p + 1 q = 1)). Summarizing, we have proved that V is weakly increasing if either (T2) or (U2) hold which implies the desired result
Finally, adopting an argument used and proved in Morand & Reffett (2003 , p.1360 , monotonicity of T P and w → w − T P (w), w ∈ W imply continuity of T P .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Let P ∈ G be arbitrary. We need to show that T P is C 1 . Since P is C 1 , so are the mappingsP , S, D, andÑ defined in (A.1) and (A.2) and G defined in (A.5). Recall that for each w ∈ W, K P determines the unique zero of G(·; w). Since ∂ k G(k; w) > 0, K P is C 1 by the implicit function theorem. Thus, T P =P • K P is C 1 as well.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.4
We only prove the strict inequalities, as the proof of the weak inequalities is analogous.
Since G is convex, P λ ∈ G and the derivative satisfies 0 ≤ P λ ≤ 1 for all λ. Moreover, the map λ → P λ = P 0 + λ∆ where ∆ := P 1 − P 0 > 0 is strictly increasing. Let w ∈ W be arbitrary but fixed. By Lemma 2.1 (and a slight abuse of notation), for each λ ∈ [0, 1] there exists a unique pair (k λ , p λ ) which solves H 1 (k λ , p λ ; w, λ) = H 2 (k λ , p λ ; w, λ) = 0. We will now show that λ → k λ , λ ∈ [0, 1] is strictly decreasing and λ → p λ , λ ∈ [0, 1] is strictly increasing. This implies p 1 > p 0 and k 1 < k 0 and the claim.
Employing the same definitions and notation as in the proof of Lemma 2.1, write
To compute the partial derivatives of D and N , note that
Taking the derivative of (A.10) one obtains, exploiting (U1) and suppressing arguments when convenient
where ∆(k, θ) :
We show that dk λ dλ < 0. As k λ is the unique solution to G(k, λ) := u (w − k −P (k, λ)) − D(k, λ) = 0, the implicit function theorem yields the derivative
By (U1) and strict monotonicity of c λ , the map S(k, λ) : Further, combining (A.10) with (A.12) and (A.14) shows that ∂ λP (k, λ) > 0. Using these results with (A.13) and (A.14) in (A.15) gives
Second, we show that dp λ dλ > 0. As p λ =P (k λ , λ) one obtains the derivative dp λ dλ
Using (A.15), the derivative (A.16) can equivalently be written as dp
where
. By (A.13) and our previous result, both the denominator and the first term in the numerator in (A.17) are strictly positive. Hence, it suffices to show that M (k λ , λ) ≥ 0. Using the explicit form of the derivatives ∂ kP and ∂ λP computed from (A.10), this last expression can be written as
Using (U1), (A.12), and (A.14) gives .11) and (A.13) , recalling that 0 ≤ P λ ≤ 1,
This shows that M (k λ , λ) ≥ 0 and proves the claim.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 2.1
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1 (i) We show the fixed point property for d = 0. The proof for d > 0 is analogous. For convenience, we drop the subscript d = 0 and denote the sequence (T n P 0 ) n≥0 simply as (P n ) n≥0 and its pointwise limit by P * . Also, for the sake of brevity we abuse our notation by writing P (k, θ) instead of P (W (k, θ)).
Let w ∈ W be arbitrary but fixed. As (P n ) n is a decreasing sequence of functions in G , monotonicity of K • due to Lemma 2.4 implies that the sequence k n := K Pn (w), n ≥ 0 is strictly increasing and converges to some limit 0 < k * ≤ K 0 (w) ≤ k max . The claim will follow if we show that k * and p * := P * (w) satisfy (12), i.e., H 1 (k * , p * ; w, P * , 0) = H 2 (k * , p * ; w, P * , 0) = 0. Uniqueness of the solution to (12) then implies k * = K P * (w).
Let θ ∈ [θ min , θ max ] be arbitrary but fixed. We show that lim n→∞ P n (k n , θ) = P * (k * , θ). As (P n ) n≥0 is a sequence of increasing functions which converges pointwise to the continuous function P * , convergence is uniform on W := [W (k 0 , θ min ), w max ] ⊂ W by Theorem A in Buchanan & Hildebrandt (1908) . Note that W (k n , θ) ∈ W for n ≥ 0.
Thus, for each δ > 0, there is n 0 ≥ 0 such that |P n (k n , θ) − P * (k n , θ)| < δ/2 for all n ≥ n 0 . Further, by continuity of W and P * there is n 0 > 0 such that n ≥ n 0 implies |P * (k n , θ)−P * (k * , θ)| < δ/2. Combining both insights, we have for all n ≥ max{n 0 , n 0 }:
The previous result and continuity of v and R imply for each θ ∈ [θ min , θ max ] (12) is satisfied. Since w was arbitrary, P * is a fixed point of T .
That d > 0 implies P * d > 0 follows directly from the Euler equations (11a,b) resp. (12). To prove the stated properties of P * 0 , we show that P * 0 (w) = 0 for some w ∈ W implies P * 0 (w) = 0 for all w ∈ W. Let w 0 ∈ W be arbitrary and suppose P * 0 (w 0 ) = 0. If w 0 = w max , the claim follows from monotonicity of P * 0 , so suppose w 0 < w max . By (11b) and (12), P * 0 (w 0 ) = 0 implies P * 0 (W (K P * 0 (w 0 ), θ)) = 0 ν-a.s. As θ max is contained in the support of ν, continuity of P * 0 yields P * 0 (W (K * 0 (w 0 ), θ max )) = 0. Moreover, (11a) and (12) imply K * 0 (w 0 ) = K 0 (w 0 ), the latter being defined by (5). Thus, under Assumption 3, w 1 := W (K * 0 (w 0 ), θ max ) satisfies w 1 = W (K 0 (w 0 ), θ max ) > w 0 and P * 0 (w 1 ) = 0. Let w 1 ≤ w n < w max be any value for which P * 0 (w n ) = 0. Repeating the previous argument shows that w n+1 := W (K * 0 (w n ), θ max ) = W (K 0 (w n ), θ max ) > w n and P * 0 (w n+1 ) = 0. Due to Assumption 3, the sequence (w n ) n≥1 converges monotonically to w max and P * 0 (w n ) = 0 for all n ≥ 1 implies P * 0 (w max ) = 0 due to continuity of P * 0 . The remaining inequalities follow as limits from the monotonicity of K • and T • due to Lemma 2.4 and Corollary 2.1 which imply P
+d for all m which must (weakly) also hold in the limit. As for each w ∈ W,
which is strictly increasing in d, the second inequality even holds strictly.
(ii) Follows directly from P * d ∈ G as shown in the main text and Lemma 2.2 (ii). (iii) Follows directly from the previous results and Definitions 1 and 2.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 2.5
Let (d n ) n≥0 be a sequence converging monotonically to zero. For each n ≥ 1, define (P m dn ) m≥1 as P 0 = id W and P m dn = T m dn P 0 ∈ G for m ≥ 1. This sequence is strictly monotonic and converges pointwise to P * dn ∈ G defined in (15). It follows from Theorem 1 (i) that the sequence of limits (P * dn ) n≥1 is decreasing such that the limiting function
is well-defined for all w ∈ W. Denote by P * 0 the limit in (15) for d = 0, i.e.,
for w ∈ W. We would like to show that P * *
for all m which implies P * dn ≥ P * 0 for all n. Therefore, P * * 0 ≥ P * 0 . We therefore need to show P * *
for all m ≥ 1 and, therefore, P * * 0 = P * 0 . The remainder of the proof therefore assumes that the dividend sequence is strictly positive, i.e., d n > 0 for all n and strictly decreasing.
We first show that P * * 0 in (A.18) is independent of the particular dividend sequence. For i = 1, 2, let (d i n ) n≥1 be a strictly positive sequence converging monotonically to zero. Denote by P * * ,i 0
(w) for all w ∈ W.
Since n was arbitrary, P * * ,1 0 ≥ P * * ,2 0
. Reversing the argument gives P * * ,2 0 ≥ P * * ,1 0 .
We show that P > P * * 0 implies T P > P * * 0 for any P ∈ G . As P 0 > P * * 0 and P 0 ∈ G , we then obtain by simple induction that T m P 0 > P * * 0 for all m which proves P * 0 ≥ P * * 0 . Let P ∈ G satisfy P > P * * 0 andŵ ∈ W be arbitrary. We show T P (ŵ) > P * * 0 (ŵ).
11
Givenŵ, define the compact set Wŵ := [W (K P (ŵ), θ min ), w max ] ⊂ W. We will construct a functionP ∈ G such that P >P on Wŵ. Noting that only the behavior of P andP on the interval Wŵ is relevant to compute T P (ŵ) and TP (ŵ), the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2.4 can then be used to show T P (ŵ) > TP (ŵ).
12
In order to construct such aP , set δ := min w∈Wŵ {P (w)−P * * 0 (w)} > 0. By Theorem A in Buchanan & Hildebrandt (1908) , there exists a d > 0 such that P *
on Wŵ as P * d converges montonically to P * * 0 for d 0 (here · ∞ denotes the supremum norm). By the same argument, there exists m ∈ N such that T 11 If P * * 0 ∈ G , this follows trivially by monotonicity of T and the fixed point property T P * * 0 = P * * 0 which can be established as in the proof of Theorem 1. Unfortunately, however, we only know P * * 0 ∈ G . 12 Observe that any convex combination P λ = λP + (1 − λ)P lies between P andP . Therefore, by monotonicity of
for all P ∈ G , w ∈ W and any monotonic sequence (d n ) n converging to zero.
13 Combining these results we get T P (ŵ) > TP (ŵ) P * * 0 (ŵ) for anyŵ ∈ W. To show that lim n→∞ K * dn (w) = K * 0 (w) for each w ∈ W, note that (K * dn (w)) n is increasing by Theorem 1 (i) and converges to some limit k * ≤ K 0 (w). By the same arguments used in the proof of Theorem 1 (i), k * and p * := P * 0 (w) satisfy the Euler equations at P = P * 0 and d = 0 which implies k * = K P * 0 (w) by uniqueness of the solution to (12).
B Efficiency and Inefficiency of MEA
In this appendix, we review the recursive characterization of interim Pareto optimality for stationary exchange economies obtained in Barbie & Kaul (2015) and adapt their results to characterize the optimality of ME in a stochastic production economy. As large parts of the analysis holds almost unchanged and requires mainly notational changes, we refer at many places the reader to Barbie & Kaul (2015) for the details and proofs and just repeat the core facts. To adapt the results, we need the characterization of interim optimality for production OLG models from Barbie, Hagedorn & Kaul (2007) who extended the pure exchange case in Chattopadhyay & Gottardi (1999) .
B.1 Notation and definitions
Let A = (K, C y , C o ) be a continuous, bounded MEA defined as in Section 3.2 and W = [w, w max ] be a stable set of A. Fixing the initial shock θ 0 ∈ Θ permits W to be used as the state space which corresponds to the set S in Barbie & Kaul (2015) . To adapt our notation to their setup, note that any two successive states w and w permit to recover the shock in the second period via θ = w /W (K(w), 1). Thus, define the (modified) pricing kernel m : 13 To see this, fix w ∈ W and let p n := T dn P (w) and k n := K P +dn (w). By Corollary 2.1 and monotonicity of K • , these sequences converge monotonically to values p * ≥ 0 and k * > 0, respectively. As H i (k n , p n , w, P, d n ) = 0 for all n and i = 1, 2, continuity of H i implies H i (k * , p * , w, P, 0) = 0. Uniqueness of the solution to (12) implies p * = T P (w) and k * = K P (w).
The next result follows immediately from Lemma B.1 and (B.5).
Corollary B.1
If A is inefficient at w 0 ∈ W, then J * (w 0 ) < ∞.
Following Barbie & Kaul (2015) we show that (B.5) defines a recursive structure permitting J * to be computed as a fixed point of some operator Z. For each w ∈ W, denote the set of all stationary weights U(w) = λ(w, w ) ∈ R + | w w, Note that Z is monotonic, i.e., J 1 ≥ J 2 implies ZJ 1 ≥ ZJ 2 . The operator Z can now be used to compute a value function that solves the functional equation (B.6). Construct the sequence (J n ) n≥0 of functions J n defined on W recursively by setting J 0 ≡ 1 and J n = ZJ n−1 for n ≥ 1. For each w ∈ W, define the function J ∞ (w) := lim n→∞ J n (w). (B.7)
Note that the pointwise limit in (B.7) exists since the sequence (J n ) n≥0 is increasing. We now have the following result. The proof is the same as in Barbie & Kaul (2015) for Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 (with the appropriate notational changes).
Lemma B.2
The function J ∞ defined in (B.7) is a fixed point of Z that coincides with the value function J * defined in (B.5), i.e., J ∞ = ZJ ∞ = J * .
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1 (i)
By Corollary B.1, if A is inefficient then J * (w 0 ) < ∞ for all w 0 ∈ W. Set η(w) := 1/J * (w) for w ∈ W. It follows from the same arguments as in the proofs of Proposition 4 and Theorem 2(a) in Barbie & Kaul (2015) that η is a strictly positive, uppersemicontinuous function which takes values in the unit interval (since J * > 1) and satisfies (B.3) for all w ∈ W. As boundedness of A permits to choose the lower bound w arbitrarily small, the previous construction of η can be extended to the entire interval .
As the term to the far right is a strictly increasing function whenever c * n−1 is decreasing, it follows by induction that each J n (w) = 1 + c * n (w), w ∈ W is strictly decreasing which implies J n (w) ≤ J n (w) for all n. Taking the limit gives J * (w) ≤ J * (w) for all w ∈ W. Finally, if A is inefficient at w 0 , monotonicity of J * implies J * (w 0 ) ≤ J * (w 0 ) < ∞ also for w 0 ≥ w 0 , i.e., A is also inefficient for all w 0 ≥ w 0 .
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3.2
For each w ∈ W and θ ∈ Θ, define C By the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem again, both mappings w → h (0; w) and (ξ; w) → h (ξ; w) are continuous on W and [0, α] × W, respectively. Thus, there exist ∆ 1 > 0 and ∆ 2 < 0 such that h(α; w) − h(0; w) ∆ 1 α + ∆ 2 α 2 for all w ∈ W and α ∈ [0, α]. Choosing α * > 0 sufficiently small therefore ensures that h(α * ; w) > h(0; w) for all w ∈ W.
